英国外交文件:来自外交部机密印刷的报告和文件，B系列:近东和中东，第5部分:1951-1956

在中东，外交部密切关注苏联的意图，并努力克服与伊朗政府在国有化资产问题上的分歧。在20世纪50年代，英国外交政策的背景也在迅速变化。这一点在中东非常明显，联合王国正在那里进行一项复杂的努力，以建立一个新的关系网，以取代它在该区域的存在曾经建立的条约和任务网。1930年的英伊条约因此被新谈判的特别协议(伊拉克，文件6和9)所取代。英国陆军训练人员前往土耳其的任务被解散(土耳其，文件2)，但土耳其被视为新建立的巴格达协议(中东将军，文件18)的关键角色。尽管英国军队分阶段从苏伊士基地撤出，但与埃及的对话仍在继续。苏伊士基地曾是英国在该地区的主要力量。1955年2月，艾登和埃及领导人贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔的会晤甚至被描述为“友好的”(中东将军，第5号文件)。然而，这种努力面临着一些严重的威胁。首先，该地区的稳定继续因以色列与其阿拉伯邻国之间的敌意而减弱。这场冲突在2月份爆发，起因是以色列对加沙的袭击(以色列，文件4)，英国或英美试图进行调停，但没有任何改善的迹象。英国公开表示愿意在争端中充当调解人，但遭到以色列的强烈反对(以色列，第13号文件)。事实证明，秘密的英美阿尔法项目(Project Alpha)也没有取得更大的成功。 Second, both the extent of Egypt_s ambition to emerge as the dominant Arab power and the degree to which this ambition ran counter to Britain_s regional aspirations became steadily clearer as the year progressed. A conversation between Eden and the Egyptian ambassador in April highlighted Egyptian dislike of the Baghdad Pact (Egypt, Document 4); the proposed treaty linking Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia constituted a clear counter-initiative to UK plans (Middle East General, Document 11); and most serious of all, the information in October that the Egyptians had turned to the Eastern Bloc for their latest arms purchases, suggested that cold war rivalry would further compromise the stability of the region (Egypt, Documents 14_17). Nor could the British rely on the Americans to help them in their aims. Although Macmillan and his colleagues were well aware of the desirability of acting in concert with Washington whenever possible (Iran, Document 16), the United Kingdom and the United States were out of step with one another in their planning for security arrangements in the region, as would be shown by Washington_s refusal to join the Baghdad Pact.